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Abstract 
It has been suggested that some aspects of mental state understanding recruit a rudimentary, but 
fast and efficient, processing system, demonstrated by the obligatory slowing down of judgements 
about what the self can see when this is incongruent with what another can see. We tested the 
social nature of this system by investigating to what extent these altercentric intrusions are elicited 
under conditions that differed in their social relevance and, further, how these related to self-
reported social perspective taking and empathy (Davis, 1983). In Experiment 1, adult participants 
were asked to make ͚self͛ oƌ ͚otheƌ͛ peƌspeĐtiǀe-takiŶg judgeŵeŶts duƌiŶg ĐoŶgƌueŶt ;͚self͛ aŶd 
͚otheƌ͛ ĐaŶ see the saŵe itemsͿ oƌ iŶĐoŶgƌueŶt ĐoŶditioŶs ;͚self͛ aŶd ͚otheƌ͛ ĐaŶŶot see the saŵe 
items) in conditions that were social (i.e., involving a social agent), semi-social (an arrow) or non-
social (a dual-coloured block). Reaction time indices of altercentric intrusion effects were present 
across all conditions, but were significantly stronger for the social compared to the less social 
conditions. Self-reported perspective taking and empathy correlated with altercentric intrusion 
effects in the social condition only. In Experiment 2, the significant correlations for the social 
condition were replicated, but this time with gaze duration indices of altercentric intrusion effects. 
Findings are discussed with regard to the degree to which this rudimentary system is socially 
specialized and how it is linked to more conceptual understanding.  
 
Key words: Visual perspective taking; automatic; individual differences; altercentric 
intrusion effects; Theory of Mind. 
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Introduction 
The ability to impute mental states, such as beliefs and perspectives, to oneself and to others is 
considered essential for social interaction and communication (e.g., Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; 
Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). Recently, Apperly and colleagues (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; 
Samson & Apperly, 2010) have suggested that this ability is handled by two distinct processing 
systems. One system, characterised as cognitively flexible but effortful, is argued to underpin 
ĐhildƌeŶ͛s conceptual development of beliefs and perspectives, as shown by their ability to pass 
verbal and explicit false belief and perspective-taking tasks at around four years of age (Callaghan et 
al., 2005; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). This system is linked to general reasoning abilities, such 
as executive functions and language ability (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 
2007), and is influenced by social experience (e.g., Hughes et al., 2005; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 
2002).  
The other, more rudimentary, system is characterised as being fast and efficient but not flexible.  
This automatic-like system tracks and calculates information relevant to mental state computation 
but does not achieve full conceptual understanding (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, p. 956; Samson & 
Apperly, 2010, p. 450). It is this system, they argue, that underpins ǇouŶg iŶfaŶts͛ apparent 
understanding of beliefs and perspectives as shown in non-verbal looking time tasks (e.g., He, Bolz, 
& Baillargeon, 2011; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; see also Baillargeon, 
Scott, & He, 2010 for a review). Thus, for Apperly and colleagues, the problem of understanding how 
it is that children apparently show understanding of beliefs as young as seven months (Kovács, 
Téglás, & Endress, 2010; but see Phillips et al., in press) using looking time tasks but do not pass 
explicit verbal tasks until much later, can be explained by the fact that these types of tasks do not 
tap the same systems of understanding (but see Luo & Baillargeon, 2010 and Scott, He, Baillargeon, 
& Cummins, 2012, for an alternative view). Some of the characteristics (oƌ ͞sigŶatuƌe liŵitatioŶs͟Ϳ of 
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this rudimentary system have been identified: for example, it operates under conditions of limited 
task complexity i.e., simple cues and limited numbers of objects (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Surtees, 
Butterfill, & Apperly, 2011; c.f. Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994), and is not dependent on executive function 
(Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; see also Low, 2010). However, it is unclear whether this 
rudimentary system is specifically dedicated to processing social situations and stimuli. In other 
words, it has yet to be clarified whether the rudimentary system is intrinsically social in nature or is 
more domain general. It is this issue that we address here. 
Evidence for the utilisation of the rudimentary system has been demonstrated in adults using a 
simple (Level 1) perspective-taking task (Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, 
Andrews, & Bodley-Scott, 2010; see also Low & Watts, 2013). Typically, participants are presented 
with a picture of a room containing a limited number of red discs on the wall (i.e., no more than 
three) and a single avatar in the centre (see Figures 1a and 1b). On some trials the avatar can see the 
same number of red discs as the participant (congruent condition) and on other trials the avatar can 
see only some or none of the red discs (incongruent condition). Participants are then asked to make 
judgements about how many discs they themselves can see (self condition) or how many the avatar 
is able to see (other condition). As expected, participants were slower to judge the number of discs 
the avatar could see when this conflicted with how many they themselves could see. Interestingly, 
when asked to take their own perspective, participants were also slower to judge how many discs 
were in the room when the number visually available to them differed from the number visible to 
the avatar. This was the case even when participants were not required to make any judgements 
about what the avatar could see (Samson et al., 2010, Exps 2 and 3), or when participants were 
required to engage in other cognitively demanding tasks (Qureshi et al., 2010). These results, they 
argue, indicate an obligatory, automatic-like processing (or calculation) of the other͛s perspective 
which interfered with the processing of self-perspective, referred to as an altercentric intrusion. 
Taken together, these findings suggest the notion of a fast, efficient system operating free from 
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executive control (unlike the cognitively flexible system) but within the constraints of limited 
complexity (such as small numbers of objects, simple instructions and task demands) ― precisely, 
they argue, the conditions under which infants͛ apparent understanding of beliefs and perspectives 
(e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) have been demonstrated.  
However, it is still unclear as to whether such a rudimentary system is inherently dedicated to 
process specifically social information or whether it is more domain general in nature. In other 
words, it has yet to be clarified whether this is a generic system for processing potentially conflicting 
information without specific reference to the domain (Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008; Zaki, 
Hennigan, Weber, & Ochsner, 2010) or whether it is selective for social information such as that 
likely to involve a social agent (Kovács et al., 2010; Shelton, Clements-Stephens, Lam, Pak, & Murray, 
2011).  
Domain-general accounts for belief and perspective understanding are plausible (Perner, 2000). For 
example, Perner, Brandl, and Garnham (2003) argue that perspective-understanding problems 
require the higher-order integration of representations in a way that is independent of the social 
nature of this information (see also Iao, Leekam, Perner, & McConachie, 2011). In support of this, for 
example, Perner and colleagues show that social understanding of belief (i.e., that the mind can 
represent one thing in more than one way) co-occurs with the non-social understanding of identity 
(that one thing can be labelled in more than one way; Perner, Mauer, & Hildenbrand, 2011). It is 
possible, therefore, that the rudimentary system could similarly process information about 
potentially conflicting perspectives by drawing on a general system that is not inherently social in 
nature. In contrast to the domain-general account, other authors (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2010; 
Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005) argue that understanding of beliefs and perspectives is innately 
specialized. In support of this, Kovács et al. (2010, Exp 3) have shown that it was the presence of a 
social agent (a cartoon figure) rather than a comparable non-social object that modulated reaction 
times to false-belief scenarios and, as such, are part of the evidence for a ͞soĐial seŶse͟ (Kovács et 
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al., 2010 p. 1831, see also Surtees, Noordzij, & Apperly, 2012). The rudimentary system may be 
similarly specialized towards information relevant to social agents.  
We took two approaches to address this issue. Our first approach was to manipulate, across three 
conditions, the degree of social relevance of stimuli in a similar perspective-taking task to the one 
used by Apperly and colleagues (Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010). Two previous studies 
(Samson et al., 2010 Exp 3; Surtees & Apperly, 2012) have employed non-social stimuli to control for 
possible non-social (e.g., task switching) task demands. This is the first systematic investigation of 
the influence of differing degrees of social relevance.  To do this we manipulated the presence or 
otherwise of a social agent (Böckler, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012; Kovács et al., 2010; Shelton et al., 
2011). Participants were presented with either a social cue (avatar; Samson et al., 2010), a semi-
social cue (arrow, which possesses both symbolic and social characteristics; Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, 
& Ngan, 2004; Ristic, Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002; see also Zwickel, 2009), or a non-social cue (a dual-
coloured block). Additionally, given the known effect of pronoun use ;paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ the use of ͞Ǉou͟Ϳ 
on inducing or modulating social perspective taking (Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, & Taylor, 
2009), we modified the instructions for selecting perspective across conditions by employing 
personal pronouns in the social cue condition but replacing them in the other two conditions. Thus, 
whilst we kept the basic selection requirements constant across conditions, the social content of the 
cue stimuli and instructions was varied. If this automatic-like processing system is indeed social in 
nature we would expect to see altercentrici intrusion effects for the social, and to a lesser degree the 
semi-social, task, but no intrusion effects for the non-social task. Alternatively, if this system is not 
socially specialized but rather is utilising a domain-general system, then we would expect to see 
equivalent altercentric intrusions across all tasks independently of the degree of social relevance. It 
should be noted, howeveƌ, that a ͚doŵaiŶ-geŶeƌal sǇsteŵ͛ eǆplaŶatioŶ is Ŷot the oŶlǇ plausible 
account of such equivalent altercentric intrusion effects. It is possible that there may be more than 
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one underlying mechanism for cueing effects elicited by biologically relevant (e.g. avatar) and 
biologically irrelevant (e.g., arrow, dual-coloured block) cues (see Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). 
Our second approach involved going beyond manipulating the social nature of the stimuli to 
consider individual differences. Although individual differences have been shown in the cognitively 
flexible system in adults (e.g., Brunyé et al., 2012; Shelton et al., 2011) and children (Deák, Ray, & 
Brenneman, 2003; Farrant, Devine, Maybery, & Fletcher, 2012), they have not, to the best of our 
knowledge, been investigated with respect to the rudimentary, automatic-like system. We were 
specifically interested in how self-reported perspective taking and empathy, as measured by the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980, 1983), would positively relate to altercentric 
intrusions. Since little is known about whether or how the rudimentary system relates to the more 
explicit, cognitively flexible system, either during the on-line processing of a task or through 
development (but see Low, 2010 and Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012), any finding of 
a positive association between individual differences in this system and self-reported perspective 
taking would be of interest. However, with respect to our specific question as to the domain-general 
or domain-specific nature of the rudimentary system, should we find a positive association, we 
would expect this pattern across all conditions if this system is domain general but only for the social 
agent (avatar) condition if the system is socially specialized. As described thus far, altercentric 
intrusion effects were assessed primarily using reaction times, but here a looking time measure of 
altercentric intrusions was also employed in order to explore further the correlational results, 
obtained using the RT indices.  
In sum, we aimed to investigate whether the rudimentary, automatic-like system proposed by 
Apperly and colleagues (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Samson & Apperly, 2010; Surtees et al., 2011) is 
domain general (geared to process conflicting or incongruent cues irrespective of their social nature) 
or domain specific (socially specialized) in nature. We approached this question in two ways. First, 
we examined whether altercentric intrusions are produced only by socially relevant stimuli (i.e., by 
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the presence of a social agent) or occur also with physically comparable, non-social stimuli. Second, 
we explored whether self-reported empathy and understanding of otheƌs͛ perspectives were 
associated with altercentric intrusions when elicited by social stimuli only, or whether they were also 
related to intrusions elicited by non-social stimuli. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants: 
Data for the social task (avatar) were obtained from 33 participants (16 females) with a mean age of 
21.8 (SD = 6.5) ranging from 18 to 48 years of age. Data for the semi-social task (arrow) were 
obtained from 32 participants (16 females) with a mean age of 29.9 (SD = 5.4) ranging from 23 to 44 
years of age. Data for the non-social task (dual-coloured block) were obtained from 44 participants 
(35 females) with a mean age of 20.9 (SD = 1.7) ranging from 18 to 25 years of age. Of the original 
data set (N = 135), 13% of participants were excluded due to accuracy below 50% of trials for at least 
one condition as were 6% who had overall mean RTs above 2.5 SD of the overall mean RT. A one-
way ANOVA was carried out on the age differences and a significant difference was found (F(2,106) = 
38.03, p < .001) between groups. Paired contrasts (Bonferroni-corrected) found participants from 
the semi- social task to be significantly older than participants from both the social (p < .001) and the 
non-social (p < .001) tasks. Participants were rewarded with either course credits or monetary 
compensation.  
Materials 
Apparatus and experimental set-up. Stimuli were presented on a Dell computer running a Windows 
operating system and stimulus presentation was controlled with E-prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc.). The stimuli were adapted from Vogeley et al. (2004) and Samson et al. (2010). 
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‘eaĐtioŶ tiŵes ;‘TsͿ ǁeƌe ƌeĐoƌded fƌoŵ keǇ pƌesses: ͚ŵ͛ foƌ a ͚Tƌue͛ aŶd ͚ǆ͛ foƌ a ͚False͛ ƌespoŶse to 
the preceding statement. These response options were clearly marked on the keyboard.  
Perspective-taking and digit prompts.  The perspective-taking prompt indicating the perspective (i.e., 
YOU/HE for the social task; ROOM/ARROW for the semi-social task; ROOM/GREEN [or BLACK] for the 
non-social task) was followed by a digit (0-3) stating the number of red discs the perspective-taking 
unit might be able to see and/or was oriented towards. The red disc configurations were matched 
between first- and third- person perspective trials and were identical across the three tasks (social, 
semi-social, non-social).  All prompts were presented in solid black on a dark grey background and 
positioned in the centre of the screen. 
Target stimuli. Target stimuli were presented in a depiction of a three-dimensional room including a 
back wall, and two side walls with a varying number of red discs (0-3). For the social task the target 
perspective-taking unit was an avatar (created using Poser 7; e frontier, Tokyo, Japan). For the semi-
social task the perspective-taking unit was an arrow and for the non-social task the perspective-
taking unit consisted of a dual-coloured (green and black) block. All perspective-taking units were 
depicted at centre or slightly off centre (50% of trials oriented to the left and 50% oriented to the 
right).  
Inter-stimulus fixations. Interspersed between prompts and targets were black fixation crosses, 
displayed centrally on a dark grey background. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). We were particularly interested in two subscales, 
Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern, from this non-clinical, self-report measure. We used 
these two measures to investigate individual differences and their potential relation to RT measures 
of altercentric intrusions. These subscales were each calculated from seven items using a 5-point 
Likeƌt sĐale ǀaƌǇiŶg fƌoŵ ͚does Ŷot desĐƌiďe ŵe ǁell͛ to ͚desĐƌiďes ŵe ǀeƌǇ ǁell͛. Perspective Taking 
;α = .ϲϵͿ iteŵs iŶĐluded stateŵeŶts suĐh as ͚I tƌǇ to look at eǀeƌǇďodǇ͛s side of a disagƌeeŵeŶt 
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ďefoƌe I ŵake a deĐisioŶ͛, aŶd EŵpathiĐ CoŶĐeƌŶ ;α = .ϳϱͿ iŶĐluded stateŵeŶts suĐh as ͚I ofteŶ haǀe 
tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me͛.  
Procedure 
Participants were introduced to the stimuli and given both oral and written instructions. Judgements 
were to be made according to first- ;͞self͟Ϳ aŶd thiƌd- ;͞otheƌ͟Ϳ peƌsoŶ peƌspeĐtiǀes as folloǁs. 
Participants in the social task were asked to make perspective judgements about the number of red 
discs they themselves could see or how many red discs the avatar was oriented towards (prompts: 
YOU/HE). For the semi-social task the participants made judgements about the number of red discs 
in the room from their own perspective or how many the arrow was oriented towards (prompts: 
ROOM/ARROW). Finally, for the non-social task participants were asked to make judgements about 
how many red discs were in the room from their own perspective or how many red discs a pre-
specified side of the dual-coloured block was orientated towards (half of participants were asked to 
make judgements about the green side only and half were asked to make judgements about the 
black side only) (prompts: ROOM/GREEN or ROOM/BLACK). Following 10 practice trials, the 
experiment proper commenced. Half of experimental trials consisted of the first person perspective 
;͞self͟: YOU/‘OOMͿ aŶd the otheƌ half of tƌials ĐoŶsisted of thiƌd peƌsoŶ peƌspeĐtiǀes ;͞otheƌ͟: 
HE/ARROW/GREEN). Half of trials were congruent (first person and third person share visual scene; 
see Figure 1a) and half of trials were incongruent (first person and third person do not share visual 
scene; see Figure 1b). The experiment consisted of two experimental blocks, each containing 48 
eǆpeƌiŵeŶtal tƌials ;ϭϮ ͞self͟ ĐoŶgƌueŶt; ϭϮ ͞self͟ iŶĐoŶgƌueŶt; ϭϮ ͞otheƌ͟ ĐoŶgƌueŶt; ϭϮ ͞otheƌ͟ 
incongruent) and 12 filler trials (the digit prompt did not correspond to either perspective) pseudo-
randomly sequenced within each experimental block. The total number of experimental trials was 
therefore 96 (24 trials for each condition), plus 24 filler trials.  
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                           Social          Semi-social                       Non-social 
a) 
 
b) 
 
 
Figure 1. a) Examples of congrueŶt trials: ͞self͟ aŶd ͞other͟ share visual iŶforŵatioŶ ďͿ Exaŵples of 
iŶĐoŶgrueŶt trials: ͞self͟ aŶd ͞other͟ do Ŷot share visual iŶforŵatioŶ  
Each trial started with a fixation cross displayed for 1000ms. This was followed by the perspective-
taking prompt, which was shown for 750ms. The prompt indicated which perspective the participant 
ǁas ƌeƋuiƌed to take foƌ that paƌtiĐulaƌ tƌial, i.e., fiƌst oƌ thiƌd peƌspeĐtiǀe ;͞self͟ oƌ ͞otheƌ͟Ϳ.  A 
fixation cross was then displayed for 1000ms and followed by the digit prompt for 750ms. The digit 
prompt indicated the number of red discs that the participant would be able to see, or the 
perspective-taking unit would be oriented towards, (i.e., 0-3), during the following target stimulus 
presentation. This prompt was followed by a fixation cross for 1000ms. The target stimulus was then 
displayed until a response was detected. Participants were required to respond either True or False 
depeŶdiŶg oŶ the pƌeĐediŶg ͚stateŵeŶt͛ ;e.g., ͚HE͛ ͚Ϯ͛ [he ĐaŶ see Ϯ ƌed disĐs]Ϳ as fast and as 
accurately as possible. See Figure 2 for a schematic representation of the presentation sequence for 
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a single trial. Once a response was detected a new trial was initiated. Following the two 
experimental blocks participants were asked to complete the IRI (Davis, 1983). 
 
Figure 2. Level 1 perspective taking task presentation timeline for a single trial 
Results  
Analyses of RTs were performed on experimental trials only (not filler trials)ii. Experimental trials 
with incorrect responses (8.5% of data) were discarded. In order to reduce the influence of outliers, 
RTs that were less than 250ms or ±2.5 standard deviations (SDs) from the overall mean for each 
participant were excluded (2.5% of data). RT indices of altercentric and egocentric intrusions were 
calculated by subtracting congruent trial mean RTs from incongruent trial mean RTs for first-person  
(self) and third-peƌsoŶ ;͞otheƌ͟Ϳ peƌspeĐtiǀes respectively (see Tables 1 and 3 for mean RTs). Thus, 
the larger the difference score, the more interference was caused by the irrelevant perspective, i.e., 
the more pronounced the intrusion.  An ANOVA was carried out on these RT indices of intrusion 
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effects with a between-subjects factor of task (social vs. semi-social vs. non-social) and a within-
subjects factor of intrusion type (altercentric vs. egocentric). The ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of intrusion type, F(1,106) = 16.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .13 and a significant main effect of task, 
F(2,106) = 6.99, p = .001, ηp2 = .92. Although there was no higher order interaction between Task and 
Intrusion type, F(2,106) = 2.25, p = .110, ηp2 = .04, planned partial one-way ANOVAs were conducted 
separately on altercentric and egocentric intrusion effects in order to allow for a direct examination 
of our specific hypotheses relating to the altercentric intrusions. Error indices of altercentric 
iŶtƌusioŶ effeĐts ǁeƌe also ĐalĐulated ďǇ suďtƌaĐtiŶg ͚ĐoŶgƌueŶt͛ tƌial ŵeaŶ eƌƌoƌ ƌespoŶses fƌoŵ 
͚iŶĐoŶgƌueŶt͛ tƌial ŵeaŶ eƌƌoƌ ƌespoŶses foƌ fiƌst peƌsoŶ ;selfͿ aŶd thiƌd-person (other) perspectives, 
respectively (see Tables 1 and 3 for mean errors). A task (social vs. semi-social vs. non-social) by 
intrusion type (altercentric vs. egocentric) ANOVA on these error indices revealed a significant main 
effect of intrusion type, F(1,106) = 10.88, p = .001, ηp2 = .91, a main effect of task, F(2,106) = 4.28, p = 
.016, ηp2 = .74, and a significant interaction between Intrusion type and Task, F(2,106) = 11.43, p < 
.ϬϬϭ, ηp2 = .99. 
Altercentric intrusion effects 
One-sample t-tests confirmed the presence of altercentric RT intrusions across the three task 
conditions as all indices differed significantly from zero (all ps < .001). (See Table 1 for reaction time 
data). 
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Table 1: MeaŶ reaĐtioŶ tiŵes ;RTͿ iŶ ŵs aŶd ŵeaŶ errors for ͞self͟ trials for soĐial, seŵi-social, and non-
social conditions (standard deviation in parentheses).  
͞“elf͟ trials  Social  
N = 33 
Semi-social 
 N = 32 
Non-social  
N = 44 
Total  
N = 109 
Congruent RT 844.7 (218.2 ) 974.5 (321.3) 784.7 (252.7) 858.6 (274.6) 
 Errors 1.0 (.9) .5 (.7) 1.3 (1.5) 1.0 (1.2) 
Incongruent RT 1006.7 (275.8) 1090.5 (361.3) 843.3 (249.7) 965.3 (309.9) 
 Errors 3.9 (1.7) 1.7 (1.7) 2.0 (1.7) 2.5 (1.9) 
Intrusion effects RT 162.0 (109.5) 116.1 (119.5) 58.6 (96.1) 106.8 (115.0) 
 Errors 2.9 (1.9) 1.2 (1.8) .7 (1.6) 1.5 (2.0) 
Total RT 925.7 (242.5) 1032.5 (336.6) 814 (246.6) 912.0 (287.1) 
 Errors 2.5 (1.0) 1.1 (1.0) 1.6 (1.4) 1.7 (1.3) 
 
We performed a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a between-subjects factor of task (social 
vs. semi-social vs. non-social) on altercentric RT intrusion indices (see also Thomas & Zumbo, 2011).  
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect, F(2,106) = 8.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .14iii. Planned contrasts 
(Helmert) revealed significantly greater altercentric intrusion for the social task (M = 162.0 ms, SD = 
109.5) when compared against the semi-social (M = 116.1 ms, SD = 119.5) and non-social (M = 
58.6ms, SD = 96.1) tasks, t(106) = 3.32, p = .001, as well as significantly greater altercentric intrusion 
during the semi-social compared to the non-social task, t(106) = 2.30, p = .023 (see Figure 3). The 
altercentric intrusion RT indices portray a linear-like relationship between the degree of social 
relevance and the magnitude of altercentric intrusions; the more social the task the greater the 
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altercentric intrusion. A polynomial analysis found this linear relationship between the three tasks to 
be significant, F(1,106) = 17.49, p < .001.  
 
Figure 3. Altercentric intrusion RT indices in ms (standard error of the mean) 
To investigate their potential positive associations with altercentric intrusions, the Perspective 
Taking and Empathic Concern subscales of the Davis IRI (Davis, 1983; see Table 2) were correlated 
with altercentric intrusion indices using PeaƌsoŶ͛s CoƌƌelatioŶ, one-tailed. Some participants did not 
complete the IRI (one in the social, one in the semi-social and five in the non-social task condition), 
resulting in a slightly reduced sample size for these analyses. Significant positive correlations were 
found for the social task between altercentric intrusion and Perspective Taking, r = .32, p = .035, and 
altercentric intrusion and Empathic Concern, r = .34, p = .029 (see also Figure 4a and 4b)iv.  There 
were no significant correlations between altercentric intrusion effects and self-reported Perspective 
Taking or Empathic Concern for either the Semi-social or Non-social conditions (all rs < -.17, ps > .05; 
see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern subscales of the IRI and 
correlations with altercentric intrusion effects for the social, semi-social, and non-social conditions.  
 Mean (S.D.)  Correlations 
 Social Semi-social Non-social  Social Semi-social Non-social 
 
N = 32 N = 31v N= 39     
Perspective 
Taking 
2.1 (.7) 2.4 (.5) 2.5 (.6)  .32*  -.01 -.07 
Empathic 
Concern 
2.3 (.8) 2.2 (.5) 2.9 (.6)  .34* -.04 -.17 
* p < .05, all p values one-tailed   
a)       b) 
 
Figure 4. a) Scatteplot for the correlation between Perspective Taking (IRI) and altercentric intrusion effects 
(reaction time in milliseconds) for the Social task in Experiment 1. R2 Linear = .105. b) Scatterplot for the 
correlation between Empathic Concern (IRI) and altercentric intrusion effects (reaction time in milliseconds) 
for the Social task in Experiment 1. R2 Linear = .114. 
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One-sample t-tests also confirmed the presence of altercentric error intrusion effects across the 
three task conditions as all error indices differed significantly from zero (all ps < .01) (see Table 1 for 
error data). 
A one-way ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of task (social vs. semi-social vs. non-social) on 
altercentric error intrusion indices revealed a significant main effect, F(2,106) = 15.65, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.23. Bonferroni-corrected comparisons showed a significant difference between the social task (M = 
2.9, SD = 1.9) and both the semi-social (M = 1.2, SD = 1.8) and the non-social (M = .7, SD = 1.6) tasks 
(p < .001). There was no significant difference between the semi-social and the non-social tasks (p = 
.72) (see also Figure 5). These results suggest that there was no speed-accuracy trade-off. 
 
Figure 5. Altercentric intrusion error response indices in the form of mean difference scores (standard error 
of the mean) 
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Egocentric intrusion effects 
Indices of egocentric RT intrusions for the three tasks (social, semi-social, non-social) are displayed in 
Figure 6. One-sample t-tests confirmed the presence of egocentric intrusions across the three task 
conditions as all indices differed significantly from zero (all ps < .001). (See Table 3 for reaction time 
data). 
Table 3 : MeaŶ reaĐtioŶ tiŵes ;RTͿ iŶ ŵs aŶd ŵeaŶ errors for ͞other͟ trials for soĐial, seŵi-social, and non-
social conditions (standard deviation in parentheses).  
͞“elf͟ trials  Social  
N = 33 
Semi-social 
 N = 32 
Non-social  
N = 44 
Total  
N = 109 
Congruent RT 897.6 (271.9) 1023.7 (320.2) 828.5 (220.6) 906.7 (278.0) 
 Errors 1.1 (1.4) 1.3 (2.6) 1.0 (1.2) 1.1 (1.8) 
Incongruent RT 1076.7 (271.1) 1213.2 (411.6) 979.1 (274.7) 1077.4 (331.4) 
 Errors 3.5 (2.0) 3.1 (2.6) 4.1 (2.4) 3.6 (2.3) 
Intrusion effects RT 179.1 (124.2) 189.5 (132.6) 150.6 (98.0) 170.7 (117.2) 
 Errors 2.4 (2.3) 1.9 (2.8) 3.1 (2.1) 2.5 (2.4) 
Total RT 987.2 (264.3) 1118.4 (362.8) 903.8 (244.3) 992.0 (300.2) 
 Errors 2.3 (1.3) 2.2 (2.1) 2.5 (1.6) 2.4 (1.7) 
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We performed an ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of task (social vs. semi-social vs. non-
social) on the egocentric RT intrusion indices.   The ANOVA revealed no significant difference 
between the three levels of social relevance, F(2,106) = 1.15, p = .322, ηp2 = .02 (social task: M = 
179.1, SD = 124.2; semi-social task: M = 189.5, SD = 132.6; non-social task: M = 150.7, SD = 98.0). 
There were no significant correlations between egocentric intrusion effects and self-reported 
Perspective Taking or Empathic Concern (all rs < .25, ps > .05). 
 
Figure 6: Egocentric intrusion RT indices in the form of mean difference scores in ms (standard error of the 
mean) 
One-sample t-tests also confirmed the presence of egocentric error intrusions across the three task 
conditions as all error indices differed significantly from zero (all ps ≤ .001) (see Table 3 for error 
data). 
A one-way ANOVA with a between-subjects factor of task (social vs. semi-social vs. non-social) on 
egocentric intrusion indices revealed no significant main effect, F(2,106) = 2.74, p = .07, ηp2 = .05. 
(social task: M = 2.4, SD = 2.3; semi-social task: M = 1.9, SD = 2.8; non-social task: M = 3.1, SD = 2.1). 
See also Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Egocentric intrusion error response indices in the form of mean difference scores (standard error of 
the mean) 
Experiment 2 
Given the novel finding of an association between the rudimentary and cognitively flexible systems 
for perspective taking, as indicated by the significant positive correlations between altercentric 
intrusions and self-report measures of Perspective Taking and Empathic Concern for the social task, 
we sought to replicate this finding using measures of gaze duration. These latter measures are 
increasingly used to investigate social cognitive processing, particularly in view of their close 
association with attentional processes (Guillon, Hadjikhani, Baduel, & Rogé, 2014; Rubio-
Fernáandez, 2013; Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 2012). It is predicted that the slowing of 
processing of self-perspective due to interference caused by the automatic pƌoĐessiŶg of aŶotheƌ͛s 
perspective should be reflected in longer gaze duration on the social agent (avatar) and surrounding 
discs for inconsistent relative to consistent trials. In line with the previous experiment, this 
altercentric intrusion effect is anticipated to relate positively to self-reported perspective taking and 
empathy.  
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Method 
Participants 
Data were obtained from 28 participants (14 female) with a mean age of 23.6 (SD = 6.6) ranging 
from 18 to 46 years of age. Of the original data set (N = 39) six participants were excluded due to 
poor calibration. A further five were excluded due to low accuracy scores (below 50% for one or 
more conditions).  
Materials 
Apparatus and experimental set-up.  As with the RT studies stimuli were presented on a Dell 
computer running a Windows operating system. Stimulus presentation was controlled with Tobii 
Studio 2.3 (Tobii Technology) and verbal answers were recorded to measure accuracy. All other 
aspects of the stimuli were the same as those used for the Social task. Total duration of looking 
within the area of interest was recorded using a Tobii X120 eye-tracker. The area of interest 
incorporated three equivalent elliptical regions focusing on: a) the avatar; b) the area between the 
avatar and the discs in front ;aǀataƌ͛s ǀieǁiŶg peƌspeĐtiǀeͿ; ĐͿ the aƌea ďetǁeeŶ the aǀataƌ aŶd the 
discs behind (see Figure 8). The IRI was also employed using the two subscales of Perspective Taking 
;α = .ϳϭͿ aŶd EŵpathiĐ CoŶĐeƌŶ ;α = .ϴϯͿ. 
                                             
Figure 8: Gaze duration was collapsed across three areas of interest. See here an example for a) congruent 
trial (͞self͟ aŶd ͞other͟ share visual iŶforŵatioŶͿ aŶd iŶĐoŶgrueŶt trial ;͞self͟ aŶd ͞other͟ do Ŷot share 
visual information).  
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Procedure 
Each trial started with a fixation cross displayed for 1000ms, which was followed by the perspective-
taking prompt, shown for 1000ms. A fixation cross was then displayed for 2000ms and followed by 
the digit prompt for 1000ms. This prompt was followed by a fixation cross for 2000ms and the target 
stimulus was then displayed until a response was detected. Instructions were given in accordance 
with the Social RT study (Experiment 1) with the exception that responses were verbal. The 
eǆpeƌiŵeŶt ĐoŶsisted of ϲϰ eǆpeƌiŵeŶtal tƌials ;ϭϲ ͞self͟ ĐoŶgƌueŶt, ϭϲ ͞self͟ iŶĐoŶgƌueŶt, ϭϲ 
͞otheƌ͟ ĐoŶgƌueŶt, ϭϲ ͞otheƌ͟ iŶĐoŶgƌueŶtͿ aŶd ϭϲ filleƌ trials.  All other aspects of the procedure 
were identical to those for Experiment 1. 
 
Results 
Analyses of gaze duration, collapsed across the three areas of interest, were based on correct 
experimental trials (2.8% incorrect trials discarded). Error rates across the four conditions were as 
follows: self-congruent M = .07, SD = .26; self-incongruent M = .93, SD = 1.3; other-congruent M = 
.26, SD = .71; other-incongruent M = .5; SD = .75. Gaze duration indices of altercentric intrusions 
were calculated by subtracting congruent trial mean gaze durations (M = 793.3ms, SD = 374.4) from 
incongruent trial mean gaze durations (M = 1351.4ms, SD = 557.5) for first-person (self) 
perspectives. Gaze duration indices of egocentric intrusions were calculated by subtracting 
congruent trial mean gaze durations (M = 1002.4ms, SD = 348.0) from incongruent trial mean gaze 
durations (M = 1312.9, SD = 514.9) for third-person (other) perspectives. Thus, the larger the 
difference score, the more interference was caused by the irrelevant perspective, i.e., the more 
pronounced the intrusion.  One paƌtiĐipaŶt͛s difference score was an outlier for the altercentric 
measure which affected both skewness and kurtosis (z scores > 3). To normalize the data we 
therefore Winsorized the score for this participant. Notably, altercentric intrusion effects (M = 
522.2ms, SD = 326.1) were significantly greater than egocentric intrusion effects (M = 310.5ms, SD = 
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404.0), t(27) = 2.39, p = .024. Gaze duration indices of altercentric (M = 522.2ms, SD = 326.1) and 
egocentric intrusions (M = 310.5ms, SD = 404.0) were correlated with the two IRI subscales PT (M = 
2.5, SD = .6) and EC (M = 2.6, SD = .7). Positive correlations were observed between altercentric 
intrusions and PT (r = .37, p = .027) and EC (r = .32, p = .051), but not between egocentric intrusions 
and the IRI subscales (rs < .20, ps > .05), all one-tailed (see also Figure 9a and 9b). 
a)                b) 
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Figure 9. a) Scatteplot for the correlation between Perspective Taking (IRI) and altercentric intrusion effects 
(gaze duration in milliseconds) for the Social task in Experiment 2. R2 Linear = .135. b) Scatterplot for the 
correlation between Empathic Concern (IRI) and altercentric intrusion effects (gaze duration in milliseconds) 
for the Social task in Experiment 2. R2 Linear = .992. 
Discussion 
Recent studies have suggested that some aspects of mental state understanding are processed by a 
rudimentary, but fast and efficient, system (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Samson & Apperly, 2010). 
Evidence for this system comes from demonstrations of the obligatory slowing down of judgements 
about what the self can see when this is inconsistent, or incongruent, with what another can see 
(i.e., altercentric intrusion effects: Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 
2012). The current study tested whether this system is intrinsically social in nature by investigating 
whether altercentric intrusions are elicited under conditions which differ in terms of their social 
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relevance. It further investigated how these intrusion effects would relate to self-reported social 
perspective taking. 
Adult participants were asked to make  ͚self͛ oƌ ͚otheƌ͛ peƌspeĐtiǀe-taking judgements during 
congrueŶt ;͚self͛ aŶd ͚otheƌ͛ Đan see the saŵe Ŷuŵďeƌ of ƌed disĐs iŶ a ƌooŵͿ oƌ iŶĐoŶgƌueŶt ;͚self͛ 
aŶd ͚otheƌ͛ Đannot see the same number of discs) conditions that were either social (involving a 
social agent [avatar]), semi-social (involving an arrow) or non-social (involving a dual-coloured 
block). As expected, there was a slowing of decisions about what the social other (avatar) could see 
when this conflicted with what the self could see (egocentric intrusion effect). Like Apperly and 
colleagues (Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012), we also found clear 
evidence of the slowing of judgements about what the self could see when this was inconsistent 
with what the social other (avatar) could see (altercentric intrusion effect). Our study together with 
a recent investigation by Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird and Heyes (2014) provide the first 
replications of altercentric intrusions outside of the research group that originally demonstrated the 
effect (Apperly and colleagues; see Francis, 2012; Koole & Lakens, 2012, for a discussion of the 
importance of replication). Crucially, these intrusion effects were not limited to the ͚social͛ 
condition. Both egocentric and altercentric intrusion effects (reflected by both reaction time and 
accuracy measures) were also shown for the semi-social and non-social levels of social relevance.   
A plausible interpretation for the presence of intrusion effects across all social conditions is that the 
͚automatic-like͛ processing of what another can see draws on a domain-general system for 
computing conflicting information that operates independently of the social nature of the 
information. Such a system is thought to be responsible for the congruency effects that have been 
reported for cognitive tasks, such as the Simon, Stroop and flanker tasks (e.g., Hommel, 2011; 
Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; see Lu & Proctor, 1995, for a review). It has also been 
discussed in association with the resolution of conflict between competing socio-emotional cues 
(e.g., Egner et al., 2008; Zaki et al., 2010), and its suggested involvement in the automatic 
  
Rudimentary Perspective Taking 
 
25 
 
ĐoŵputatioŶ of aŶotheƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe ǁould ďe consistent with domain-general accounts of belief 
and perspective understanding (e.g., Aichhorn et al., 2009; Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & 
Ladurner, 2006; Perner & Leekam, 2008). For example, Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, and 
Ladurner (2006) argued for the domain-general processing of visual perspective following evidence 
that the ͚false belief͛ task, involving how another mind might take a different perspective, and the 
͚false sign͛ task, involving how a non-mental entity might indicate a differing perspective, activated 
equivalent brain areas (e.g., the left temporo-parietal junction).  
Despite the presence of significant altercentric intrusions across social conditions, these effects were 
none the less modulated by degree of social relevance. There was a clear linear relation between 
degree of social relevance and the degree of altercentric intrusion: the social (avatar) condition 
elicited the greatest levels overall, followed by the semi-social condition (arrow), which in turn 
elicited greater levels than the non-social (dual-coloured block) condition. Arguably, the level of 
altercentric intrusion was determined by the extent to which the task was social in nature; the more 
social the task, the stronger the altercentric intrusion effect. These findings are compatible with 
studies showing attenuated altercentric intrusions for conditions in which non-social control stimuli 
were employed (Samson et al., 2010, Exp. 3; Surtees & Apperly, 2012). They support the notion of a 
degree of specialisation, or domain-specific processing, operating possibly in conjunction with the 
domain-general processing of perspectives. Similar conclusions were offered by the fMRI studies 
noted above (Egner et al., 2008; Perner et al., 2006; Zaki et al., 2010), which argued not only for the 
role of domain-general processing, but also for specialisation of processing following evidence of the 
activation of separable, in addition to overlapping, brain regions, during task performance.  It should 
also be noted, however, that the effects that are being attributed in our study to possible domain-
general processes could also be explicable in terms of task-switching or other strategies. For 
eǆaŵple, the Ŷeed to alteƌŶate ďetǁeeŶ ͚self͛ aŶd ͚otheƌ͛ peƌspeĐtiǀes ŵaǇ lead to the tƌeatŵeŶt of 
the appaƌeŶtlǇ ͚ŶoŶ-soĐial͛ stiŵulus as a soĐial ageŶt (c.f. Surtees & Apperly, 2012). This explanation 
  
Rudimentary Perspective Taking 
 
26 
 
cannot, however, account for the modulation of altercentric intrusion effects following the 
systematic manipulation of social relevance; the involvement of a socially dedicated system would 
appear to be the most parsimonious explanation for this. 
In contrast to the variation in magnitude of altercentric intrusion effects across social conditions in 
the current study, the level of egocentric intrusion was statistically equivalent across the conditions 
of social relevance. This indicates that the potential interfering effects of self-relevant (first-person 
peƌspeĐtiǀeͿ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ duƌiŶg the deliďeƌate ĐoŵputatioŶ of ͚otheƌ͛ peƌspeĐtiǀes ŵaǇ ďe iŵŵuŶe 
to the influence of social context, which is perhaps in line with the clear dominance of the self-
perspective (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; see also 
Light & Nix, 1983) and its potentially over-riding impact on the processing of competing cues.  On 
the other hand, a different pattern of results was recently obtained in a study with 8-year-old 
children (Surtees & Apperly, 2012). In this latter study, although egocentric intrusion effects were 
present for the social (avatar) condition, they were largely absent for the control (dual-coloured 
stick) condition (at least on the basis of RT data). The explanation offered by Surtees and Apperly 
(2012) was that perspective taking may be easier when participants can easily imagine themselves as 
occupying the body of the alternative position. We speculate further on why social influences may 
be present for egocentric intrusions in children but not adults a little later in the discussion. In 
general, however, it is clear that further research is needed to clarify the difference between adults 
and children in the extent to which either interference from the self-perspective, or the ease of 
adoptiŶg aŶotheƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, is ŵodulated ďǇ soĐial ĐoŶteǆt.    
The second approach taken to investigate the social nature of the rudimentary system was to test 
the relation between altercentric intrusion effects and self-reported perspective taking. Self-
reported perspective taking was measured using two subscales of the IRI (Davis, 1983): Perspective 
Taking and Empathic Concern. For the social condition, there were significant associations between 
altercentric intrusions (as reflected by reaction times) and self-reported levels of both empathic 
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concern and perspective taking, but there were no associations between these measures for the 
semi-social and non-social conditions (Experiment 1). The finding that the self-reported social ability 
to understand and empathise with other people was specifically associated with the degree of 
altercentric intrusions during the processing of socially relevant stimuli lends support to the idea 
that altercentric intrusion effects are specialised to some extent within the social domain. These 
results were further supported by the finding of significant associations between these self-report 
measures and altercentric intrusions as reflected by gaze durations (Experiment 2). 
As noted earlier, individual differences in the IRI subscales reflect the operation of an explicit, 
conceptual system (Davis, 1983, 1994; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004) for 
perspective taking, whereas altercentric intrusion effects are considered to reflect the operation of a 
fast and efficient rudimentary (implicit) system. The novel demonstration of a link between these 
systems within the social domain using two separate measures of intrusion effects (RT and gaze 
duration) across distinct experiments increases our confidence in the reliability of the correlational 
results and therefore the relation between the conceptual and rudimentary systems.  
The present association between self-reported empathic concern and perspective taking with 
altercentric intrusions within the social domain lead us to speculate about factors that may underlie 
the relation between the conceptual system and the rudimentary system. Possibly those possessing 
a rudimentary system that is more sensitive to the ĐoŵputatioŶ of otheƌs͛ peƌspeĐtiǀes ;i.e., as 
reflected by enhanced altercentric intrusion effects) may, over time, develop greater levels of 
empathy and enhanced social perspective taking abilities. Similar developmental accounts have 
been put forward to explain the link between early implicit belief understanding and later explicit 
understanding (Low, 2010; Thoermer et al., 2012). An alternative explanation is that a top-down 
modulation of the rudimentary system by system(s) (conceptual or otherwise) that are involved in 
social understanding and empathy may engender a link between enhanced social perspective taking 
ability and the greater tendency to autoŵatiĐallǇ take aŶotheƌ͛s ǀisual peƌspeĐtiǀe. It should be 
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noted at this point that the extent to which self-reported perspective taking and empathy can be 
mapped onto the more explicit, cognitive system is not entirely clear. To examine this issue, further 
research investigating the links between the rudimentary and the conceptual system should be 
pursued using visual perspective taking tasks in conjunction with behavioural indices of the explicit 
system, such as false belief or complex perspective taking tasks (e.g., the Keysar task; Keysar, Lin, & 
Barr, 2003).  
Of note, although stimuli were equated for position of main focal point of the stimuli (i.e. head of 
avatar, arrow, and dual-coloured block) there were none the less physical differences between the 
stimuli which might have led to differences in altercentric cueing effects between conditions. 
However, the fact that there were no significant differences in egocentric intrusion effects between 
social relevance conditions suggests that the altercentric findings cannot be explained simply in 
terms of cue saliency or size. Furthermore, the positive correlations found between altercentric 
intrusion effects and perspective taking and empathic concern cannot be explained easily in terms of 
individual differences in the strength of general attentional cueing effects elicited by the differing 
cue stimuli.  
As discussed thus far, the results from this study have shown that intrusion effects were significantly 
ŵoƌe pƌoŶouŶĐed ǁheŶ the ͚otheƌ͛ peƌspeĐtiǀe takiŶg uŶit ǁas soĐial as compared with less social 
or non-social, and were correlated with self-reported measures of empathy and perspective taking 
for the social condition only. We suggest that these data reveal, first, the modulation of a fast and 
efficient rudimentary system for perspective taking by social relevance, and, second, an association, 
which is socially moderated, between the rudimentary system and a cognitively flexible conceptual 
system. Our findings are comparable with those of Kovács et al. (2010), who, unlike the simple 
perspective task used here and by Apperly and colleagues, used a conceptually more demanding 
(false) belief task. They found that for this higher-order representational task, infants as well as 
adults were influenced by social (cartoon figure), but not non-social (stack of boxes), stimuli, when 
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observing belief scenarios. Their findings indicated that, at least for belief situations, adults were not 
processing the non-social stimuli to the extent of them interfering with their responses. If their 
findings are correct (see Philips et al, in press, for a recent challenge) then, taken together, the 
current results and those of Kovács et al. (2010) could be argued to be iŶdiĐatiǀe of a ͞soĐial seŶse,͟ 
that is, a predisposition for visuo-perceptual and belief computations pertaining to social (or 
mentalistic) stimuli.  
The fact that altercentric intrusion effects were still present in the current study, albeit in attenuated 
form, when less socially relevant stimuli were employed, has been discussed thus far in terms of the 
concurrent operation of a domain-general system alongside a socially specific system. However, a 
position that is equally plausible, and may be considered to be more in line with an account that 
views social processing as central to perspective taking, is that a socially specialised system is 
recruited for the processing of more general types of stimuli. This would include processing of 
perspectives signalled by socially arbitrary / non-social stimuli, although to a lesser degree than 
those signalled by social stimuli. Such an account may be considered without the need for recourse 
to the parallel operation of a domain-general system.  
Our results are unable to address the question of whether the rudimentary system is separate from 
the cognitively flexible conceptual system (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009) or whether they should 
both be viewed as aspects of one system (see Luo & Baillargeon, 2010). The extent to which the 
ƌudiŵeŶtaƌǇ sǇsteŵ ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶĐeiǀed of as ͚autoŵatiĐ͛ is also open to debate. The results of the 
current study suggest that theƌe is a degƌee of ͚uŶiŶteŶtioŶal͛ pƌoĐessiŶg of aŶotheƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe. 
However, they also indicate that a strong form of automaticity cannot be assumed as the propensity 
to adopt another͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe ǁheŶ theƌe ǁas Ŷo Ŷeed oƌ iŶteŶtioŶ to do so depeŶded iŶ paƌt oŶ 
the social status of the perceived entity (i.e., whether social, semi-social, or non-social).  The 
susceptibility of the rudimentary system to manipulations of social relevance and its associations 
with individual differences may also indicate that there are limits to its automaticity (see Moors & 
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De Houwer, 2006). Further research is required to determine the nature and extent of the limits to 
automaticity in respect of the rudimentary system. 
Further research is also needed to clarify the role of social specialisation in the separate processes 
underlying altercentric intrusions. Such research may help resolve debates concerning the extent to 
which these intrusion effects are indicative of a separate automatic-like system, as the idea of a 
separate system has been contested by researchers such as Luo and Baillargeon (2010) and Scott, 
He, Baillargeon, and Cummins (2012). As highlighted by Qureshi et al. (2010), altercentric intrusions 
may reflect two types of processes: (i) the calculation of what the avatar sees and (ii) domain-
general processes (e.g., inhibition) involved in the selection of such information in order to make a 
judgement. Our findings from the correlational analyses, which show significant positive associations 
between self-reported empathic concern, perspective taking and altercentric intrusions for the social 
task alone, suggest that the computation of what the avatar sees may rely on processes that differ 
from those involved in the orientation of attention by other cues. One possible explanation is that 
individual differences are correlating with processes of perspective selection, but that these 
processes differ according to the social relevance of the cue. A more intuitively plausible account is 
that there is a specialised role for perspective calculation within the social domain (e.g., when 
observing an avatar), which may not prevail ǁheŶ oďseƌǀiŶg less ͚soĐial͛ stiŵuli ;e.g., ŶoŶ-biological 
arrows or dual-coloured blocks). Differential underlying mechanisms for the processing of cues to 
perspective in social versus non-social domains may also account for why equivalent egocentric 
intrusion effects were obtained across cue conditions in our experiment, in contrast to the findings 
of larger egocentric intrusion effects for social (avatar) compared with non-social (dual-coloured 
stick) conditions in 8-year-old children in a recent study by Surtees and Apperly (2012). Following the 
suggestion that perspective selection requires general processing resources (e.g., Leslie et al., 2005), 
it is conceivable that age related increases in these resources may counteract any social influences 
on egocentric intrusion effects. The same argument should not hold for altercentric intrusions, as 
  
Rudimentary Perspective Taking 
 
31 
 
these would appear to be subserved by automatic perspective calculation, as well as selection, 
processes (Qureshi et al., 2010). Such calculation effects are unlikely to be influenced by age-related 
improvements in executive function or increases in general processing resources (see Qureshi et al., 
2010).  
 
In conclusion, the results from this study provide evidence foƌ the ͚uŶiŶteŶtioŶal͛ ĐoŵputatioŶ of 
visual perspective in relation to a range of perspective-taking units that vary in degree of social 
relevance. They also provide systematic evidence that these computations can be modulated by 
social context. Moreover, the results indicate an association between computation of another͛s 
perspective and self-reported empathy and perspective taking, but only when the other entity is 
perceived as cleaƌlǇ ͚soĐial͛.  
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i
 For ease of explication, throughout this manuscript we use the term “altercentric” to refer to both 
biologically relevant (avatar) and biologically irrelevant (arrows, dual-coloured blocks) cues. 
ii
 The same patterns of results were obtained irrespective of whether consistent mismatching trials or 
both consistent and inconsistent mismatching trials were removed from the analyses. See Samson et 
al. (2010, p.1257) for a discussion on the unbalanced way mismatching trials have to be constructed 
and concomitant dangers around the artificial inflation of consistency effects. 
iii
 This was still the case when using age and sex as covariates, F(2,105)=8.90, p < .001 
iv
 Spearman’s correlations were also carried out as the range of mean RTs across tasks (“Self” trials: 
Social 925.7ms; Semi-social 1032.5 ms; Non-social 814 ms) might have affected our results. These 
revealed a significant positive association between altercentric intrusion and Empathic Concern, r = 
.44, p = .005, and an association approaching significance between altercentric intrusion and 
Perspective Taking, r = .28, p = .06. 
v
 One participant in the semi-social condition was an outlier for the IRI subscale Perspective Taking. 
Removing this participant did not change the results, so this participant was left in for the analyses 
 
 
